When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro. - Hunter S. Thompson

Showing posts with label subprime mortgages. Show all posts
Showing posts with label subprime mortgages. Show all posts

13 November 2008

Loans built to self-destruct

If you'd like a preview of Michael Lewis's upcoming book on the global financial meltdown, look no further than this article in Portfolio magazine:
...[T]he scarcity of truly crappy subprime-mortgage bonds no longer mattered. The big Wall Street firms had just made it possible to short even the tiniest and most obscure subprime-mortgage-backed bond by creating, in effect, a market of side bets. Instead of shorting the actual BBB bond, you could now enter into an agreement for a credit-default swap with Deutsche Bank or Goldman Sachs. It cost money to make this side bet, but nothing like what it cost to short the stocks, and the upside was far greater.

The arrangement bore the same relation to actual finance as fantasy football bears to the N.F.L. Eisman was perplexed in particular about why Wall Street firms would be coming to him and asking him to sell short. “What Lippman did, to his credit, was he came around several times to me and said, ‘Short this market,’ ” Eisman says. “In my entire life, I never saw a sell-side guy come in and say, ‘Short my market.’”

And short Eisman did—then he tried to get his mind around what he’d just done so he could do it better. He’d call over to a big firm and ask for a list of mortgage bonds from all over the country. The juiciest shorts—the bonds ultimately backed by the mortgages most likely to default—had several characteristics. They’d be in what Wall Street people were now calling the sand states: Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada. The loans would have been made by one of the more dubious mortgage lenders; Long Beach Financial, wholly owned by Washington Mutual, was a great example. Long Beach Financial was moving money out the door as fast as it could, few questions asked, in loans built to self-destruct. It specialized in asking home­owners with bad credit and no proof of income to put no money down and defer interest payments for as long as possible. In Bakersfield, California, a Mexican strawberry picker with an income of $14,000 and no English was lent every penny he needed to buy a house for $720,000.
The End of Wall Street's Boom - Portfolio (11 November 2008)

18 July 2008

Every American family deserves a false sense of security

The Onion one-ups the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times with this piece:
A panel of top business leaders testified before Congress about the worsening recession Monday, demanding the government provide Americans with a new irresponsible and largely illusory economic bubble in which to invest.

"What America needs right now is not more talk and long-term strategy, but a concrete way to create more imaginary wealth in the very immediate future," said Thomas Jenkins, CFO of the Boston-area Jenkins Financial Group, a bubble-based investment firm. "We are in a crisis, and that crisis demands an unviable short-term solution."

[...]

"Every American family deserves a false sense of security," said Chris Reppto, a risk analyst for Citigroup in New York. "Once we have a bubble to provide a fragile foundation, we can begin building pyramid scheme on top of pyramid scheme, and before we know it, the financial situation will return to normal."
Sometimes satirists have a much better handle on the truth than reporters.

Recession-Plagued Nation Demands New Bubble To Invest In (The Onion)

21 April 2008

AngryRenter.com

All we hear these days is whining from reckless home borrowers and their banks.

But did you know that renters are 32 percent of American households? And that homes in foreclosure are less than 2 percent?

So why is Congress rushing to bailout high-flying borrowers and their lenders with our tax dollars?

Unfortunately, renters aren't as good at politics as the small minority of homeowners (and their bankers) who are in trouble. We don't have lobbyists in Washington, DC. We don't get a tax deduction for our rent and we don't get sweetheart government loans.

Quite simply, we are just Angry Renters. And now it is our time to be heard: no government bailouts!

The superficially-seeming grassroots AngryRenter.com is actually an Astroturfing project sponsored by FreedomWorks. (Of course, I'm fine with that, but we try to practice transparency here.)

20 February 2008

Slumburbs

At Windy Ridge, a recently built starter-home development seven miles northwest of Charlotte, North Carolina, 81 of the community’s 132 small, vinyl-sided houses were in foreclosure as of late last year. Vandals have kicked in doors and stripped the copper wire from vacant houses; drug users and homeless people have furtively moved in. In December, after a stray bullet blasted through her son’s bedroom and into her own, Laurie Talbot, who’d moved to Windy Ridge from New York in 2005, told The Charlotte Observer, “I thought I’d bought a home in Pleasantville. I never imagined in my wildest dreams that stuff like this would happen.”

In the Franklin Reserve neighborhood of Elk Grove, California, south of Sacramento, the houses are nicer than those at Windy Ridge—many once sold for well over $500,000—but the phenomenon is the same. At the height of the boom, 10,000 new homes were built there in just four years. Now many are empty; renters of dubious character occupy others. Graffiti, broken windows, and other markers of decay have multiplied. Susan McDonald, president of the local residents’ association and an executive at a local bank, told the Associated Press, “There’s been gang activity. Things have really been changing, the last few years.”

In the first half of last year, residential burglaries rose by 35 percent and robberies by 58 percent in suburban Lee County, Florida, where one in four houses stands empty. Charlotte’s crime rates have stayed flat overall in recent years—but from 2003 to 2006, in the 10 suburbs of the city that have experienced the highest foreclosure rates, crime rose 33 percent. Civic organizations in some suburbs have begun to mow the lawns around empty houses to keep up the appearance of stability. Police departments are mapping foreclosures in an effort to identify emerging criminal hot spots.

The decline of places like Windy Ridge and Franklin Reserve is usually attributed to the subprime-mortgage crisis, with its wave of foreclosures. And the crisis has indeed catalyzed or intensified social problems in many communities. But the story of vacant suburban homes and declining suburban neighborhoods did not begin with the crisis, and will not end with it. A structural change is under way in the housing market—a major shift in the way many Americans want to live and work. It has shaped the current downturn, steering some of the worst problems away from the cities and toward the suburban fringes. And its effects will be felt more strongly, and more broadly, as the years pass. Its ultimate impact on the suburbs, and the cities, will be profound.

The Next Slum? (The Atlantic, March 2008)

24 January 2008

Making a living off the idiocy of big Wall Street firms

Michael Lewis explains how Goldman Sachs made a pile of money shorting the subprime mortgage market... even though its own traders were locked into very painful and costly long positions:
The only difference between Goldman and everyone else was that Goldman had, in effect, an entirely separate enterprise, sitting on top of the firm, with the power to reverse the judgment of its own supposed experts in various markets. They were able to do this, apparently, without ever saying a word about it to their own traders. Instead of telling the fools trading subprime mortgages that they are wrong, and that they should unwind their positions, they simply offset their trades.

Rolling Heads

All across Wall Street risk managers are being fired, reassigned or hovering under a cloud of contempt and suspicion. Heads must roll, and after the CEO, these guys are the most plausible to guillotine.

But at the same time it's pretty clear that a lot of these so-called risk managers never really had the power to manage risk. They had to consider the feelings, for example, of the guys who ran subprime mortgages. Morgan Stanley conceded as much when it said recently it was considering changing things around so that the risk manager reported to the CFO, rather than the heads of individual businesses.

But at Goldman there were two intelligences at work: one, the ordinary Wall Street intelligence, which was allowed to get itself in trouble, just as at every other Wall Street firm; the other, more like an extremely smart hedge fund that made its living off the idiocy of big Wall Street firms, including its own people.

Bloomberg.com: What Does Goldman Know That We Don't? (Michael Lewis)

via Kottke

18 December 2007

Stagflation on the way?

I've been one of those on the stagflation bandwagon, deeply concerned about the weakness of the dollar, the likelihood of the Fed continuing to reduce rates in the face of locked-up credit markets, rising food and energy prices and persistent and rising deficits. This is a toxic macroeconomic cocktail I've written about and which has been the source of much worry. And to add insult to injury, a rash of economic statistics were released last week that generated articles this weekend that only served to reinforce my Droopy Dog attitude towards the US economic landscape. So I'm here to share the pain.
Information Arbitrage: My Gloomy Thesis Is Playing Out (18 Dec 2007)

25 November 2007

This way to the recession

I wouldn't necessarily take advice from Lawrence Summers on matters of gender politics in academia, but the man's still one of the smartest economists on the planet.

And he thinks we're in a heap of trouble:
Three months ago it was reasonable to expect that the subprime credit crisis would be a financially significant event but not one that would threaten the overall pattern of economic growth. This is still a possible outcome but no longer the preponderant probability.

Even if necessary changes in policy are implemented, the odds now favour a US recession that slows growth significantly on a global basis. Without stronger policy responses than have been observed to date, moreover, there is the risk that the adverse impacts will be felt for the rest of this decade and beyond.
Wake up to the dangers of a deepening crisis (Lawrence Summers, Financial Times, 25 November 2007)

Read on for Dr. Summers' diagnosis and policy prescriptions.

26 October 2007

North Carolina's predatory-lending laws may travel

...[A]s Washington lawmakers hash out how to deal with millions of potential foreclosures, North Carolina's predatory-lending laws are shaping the debate.

...The North Carolina Home Loan Protection Act bans penalties for borrowers who pay off their mortgages early, mandates that lenders verify income, and is expected to limit the fees brokers collect for arranging certain high-rate mortgages...

... Critics of that 1999 law argued it would crimp North Carolina's housing market. But academic studies have found no such impact. In fact, the state thrived during the boom and has fared better than most during the downturn. Foreclosure filings rose 39% in this year's first half, far less than the 56% jump nationwide, according to research firm RealtyTrac. In the second quarter, median home prices were up 8% in Charlotte, the state's largest city, and Raleigh, the capital, vs. a 1.5% average drop for the U.S. "The bottom line is that [the regulations are] working," says North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper, who sponsored the 1999 law as a state senator. "North Carolina has strong banks that are tough but fair, and there's plenty of available credit."
These Tough Lending Laws Could Travel (BusinessWeek, November 5, 2007)

06 October 2007

Advice to foreigners: Sell your Treasury bonds

Andy Xie, writing in Caijing (a Chinese business publication that republishes some of its articles in English), states his case bluntly (you'll forgive, I hope, the mild awkwardness in translation):

In a closed economy, inflation is a zero-sum game in wealth redistribution. Investors in fixed income lose and borrowers win. As the US owes so much to foreigners, inflation, at least the unexpected part, adds value to the US economy. It does give the Fed incentives to tolerate more inflation. Why then it just lets it all out and inflates away all the foreign debts? The problem is that foreigners may see what’s coming and sell everything right away. It would trigger the US bond market to collapse, which would wreck havoc on the US economy. Hence, inflation benefits the US only if foreigners can be fooled before it happens. The Fed is still paying lip service to inflation for that purpose.

You probably know what I am getting at. If you hold US bonds, sell. The Fed wants to rob you to help the bankrupting US homeowners. My hunch is that the US inflation would rise to above 4% next year and higher afterwards. Foreigners own 40% of the US treasuries, mostly central banks. They should sell now to demonstrate they wouldn’t accept the broad daylight robbery by the Fed. The selling would cause the treasury yield to skyrocket, which would offset the stimulus from the rate cut by the Fed. The Fed may have to change policy to appease foreigners when it sees the rebellion.

If foreigners don’t act and lay there like lambs, they deserve to be slaughtered.

You Should Sell Treasuries (Andy Xie, Caijing Magazine, October 2, 2007)

18 September 2007

...so 2nite we're going to party like it's 1929

moral hazard: "A situation in which someone insured against risks will purposely engage in risky behavior, knowing that any costs incurred will be compensated by the insurer. A financial system which offers "rescue packages" may encourage borrowers and lenders to undertake low-quality or high-risk investments, thus increasing the likelihood of a crisis."

Related: Markets Soar After Fed Cuts Key Rate By Half A Point (New York Times, 18 September 2007)

14 September 2007

This has all happened before

Ganked directly from Marc Andreesen's blog:
He words it rather more politely than I would:

Advice to portfolio managers around the globe: please stop referring to "7-standard deviation events" when describing performance.

Whether it's the decline in home prices in real terms, a sudden widening of credit spreads, the impact of too much leverage on previously uncorrelated hedge fund strategies, a sudden shift in liquidity, a selloff in riskier emerging market stocks and bonds despite no change in fundamentals, unexpected outflows from fund investors, problems with credit derivatives or declines in bank credit lines, this has all happened before.

The smartest managers had prepared for volatility.

The good ones will learn from what's happened and make adjustments.

Those that spend too much time explaining why it wasn't likely in the first place fall into the bottom category.

From Michael Cembalest, Chief Investment Officer of JP Morgan Private Bank (not online).
blog.pmarca.com: Quote of the week: Michael Cembalest of JP Morgan

06 September 2007

Michael Lewis explains it all for you

The subprime mortgage / credit market mess, broken down for you by Michael Lewis at Bloomberg.com:

This is what happens when you lend money to poor people.

This is way too good to excerpt.  Go read the whole thing.

Oh, okay... *one* little excerpt:
Call me a romantic: I want everyone to have a shot at the American dream. Even people who haven't earned it. I did everything I could so that these schlubs could at least own their own place. The media is now making my generosity out to be some kind of scandal. Teaser rates weren't a scandal. Teaser rates were a sign of misplaced trust: I trusted these people to get their teams of lawyers to vet anything before they signed it. Turns out, if you're poor, you don't need to pay lawyers. You don't like the deal you just wave your hands in the air and moan about how poor you are. Then you default.
A Wall Street Trader Draws Some Subprime Lessons: Michael Lewis (Bloomberg.com)

10 August 2007

Understanding liquidity risk

A few generations ago, savers responded to financial panics with runs on banks, and even healthy institutions could fail if they could not raise enough cash quickly enough.

For a long time, that all seemed to be safely relegated to the past. But now the runs are back — and this time the targets are not banks but the securities that have replaced them as the prime generators of credit in the new financial system.

“Our current system of levered finance and its related structures may be critically flawed,” said William H. Gross, the chief investment officer of Pimco, a mutual fund company. “Nothing within it allows for the hedging of liquidity risk, and that is the problem at the moment.”

A New Kind Of Bank Run Tests Old Safeguards (New York Times, August 10, 2007)

09 July 2007

Canary in the coal mine?

Despite a vibrant local economy, Atlanta homeowners are falling behind on mortgage payments and losing their homes at one of the highest rates in the nation, offering a troubling glimpse of what experts fear may be in store for other parts of the country.

The real estate slump here and elsewhere is likely to worsen, given that most of the adjustable rate mortgages written in the last three years will be reset with higher interest rates, said Christopher F. Thornberg, an economist with Beacon Economics in Los Angeles. As a result, borrowers of an estimated $800 billion in loans will be forced in the next 12 months to 18 months to make bigger monthly payments, refinance or sell their homes.
Increasing Rate of Foreclosures Upsets Atlanta (New York Times, 9 July 2007)