When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro. - Hunter S. Thompson

Showing posts with label credit market. Show all posts
Showing posts with label credit market. Show all posts

20 December 2008

Credit crunch: The board game

Credit Crunch the Board Game - The Economist - December 2008

From this week's issue of The Economist: Credit Crunch, the board game.
Players start with 500m econos each. One player doubles as banker.

Players move round by throwing four coins and progressing as many squares as they throw heads. If a player throws four heads, he moves forward four spaces and has another turn; if he throws four tails, he throws again. When a player lands on a + square, he collects money from the bank; equally, when he lands on a minus square, he pays the bank.

The aim is to be the last solvent player. In order to achieve this, players try to eliminate the competition. Risk cards encourage players to pick on each other.

Players who cannot pay their fines may borrow from each other at any rate they care to settle on—for instance, 100% interest within three turns. They should negotiate with the other players to get the best rate possible. Players who cannot borrow must either go into Chapter 11 or be taken over.

Players may conceal their assets from each other.
There are PDFs of the game board, in-game currency, and related materials at The Economist's web site.

Hat tip: Carrie

13 November 2008

How convenient!

So Carrie and I were discussing, just the other day, how we might transform ourselves into a bank holding company, in order to benefit from the TARP money that the US government is throwing around.

She and I are absolutely prepared to make reckless, ill-considered loans using other peoples' money to any applicant with a pulse, so we've got all the intellectual and moral firepower needed to operate as a modern banking institution, clearly.

Chow Bella is already very good at begging for treats, so we've got our government liaison right there.

But how to get our application for aid in front of the right people? Anyone have Neal Kashkari's cell phone number?

Oh, wait -- we can just download this form and fill it out (PDF link to ustreas.gov website).

Be right with you.

08 August 2008

Jim Cramer's famous rant, one year later

Cramer Day is upon us. This weekend marks the anniversary of former hedge fund manager Jim Cramer’s outburst on CNBC that the Federal Reserve was “asleep” and that there was “Armageddon” in the fixed income markets.

It was possibly the most entertaining five minutes of financial television ever broadcast. Those who do not work in a Wall Street trading room and have not watched the excerpt repeatedly over the past year, can watch it on YouTube, where it is a popular view.

[...]

The outburst signalled for the first time to the general public in the US that the largely technical problems for the credit market could have serious repercussions for them.

[...]

Reviewing the rant, we can see it set the template for all that followed.

[...]

Finally, Cramer wanted to pin the blame on Alan Greenspan, who had left the Federal Reserve with an impeccable reputation early in 2006. He pointed out, correctly, that Greenspan had encouraged borrowers to take out mortgages at low “teaser” rates and then proceeded to raise rates.

Those comments have become the new orthodoxy. The easy money with which the Greenspan Fed responded to the bursting of the tech bubble at the beginning of this decade is now deemed a mistake.

This was the first crisis to afflict the YouTube generation. The “Rant That Shook The World” as CNBC called it, will be an important item in financial history years from now.

Long view: Jim Cramer’s TV outburst that will last for ages (Financial Times, 1 August 2008)

18 July 2008

Every American family deserves a false sense of security

The Onion one-ups the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times with this piece:
A panel of top business leaders testified before Congress about the worsening recession Monday, demanding the government provide Americans with a new irresponsible and largely illusory economic bubble in which to invest.

"What America needs right now is not more talk and long-term strategy, but a concrete way to create more imaginary wealth in the very immediate future," said Thomas Jenkins, CFO of the Boston-area Jenkins Financial Group, a bubble-based investment firm. "We are in a crisis, and that crisis demands an unviable short-term solution."

[...]

"Every American family deserves a false sense of security," said Chris Reppto, a risk analyst for Citigroup in New York. "Once we have a bubble to provide a fragile foundation, we can begin building pyramid scheme on top of pyramid scheme, and before we know it, the financial situation will return to normal."
Sometimes satirists have a much better handle on the truth than reporters.

Recession-Plagued Nation Demands New Bubble To Invest In (The Onion)

17 July 2008

Black swans and banking

Complex systems don’t allow for slack and everybody protects that system. The banking system doesn’t have that slack. In a normal ecology, banks go bankrupt every day. But in a complex system there is a tendency to cluster around powerful units. Every bank becomes the same bank so they can all go bust together.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, interviewed in the Times of London, 1 June 2008

13 July 2008

The most deceitful form of socialism

Professor Willem Buiter, blogging for the Financial Times, has a modest proposal--and some "inconvenient truths"--to discuss with American taxpayers:
On July 11, 2008, the New York Times reported that US government officials were considering a plan for the US government to take over Fannie Mae and/or Freddie Mac if their financial situations were to worsen due to the US housing crisis. These government officials were also reported by the New York Times as stating that the government had also considered calling for an explicit federal government guarantee of $5 trillion on debt owned or guaranteed by the two companies through legislation. You can see why the creditors to these GSEs don’t seem to be too worried. There are many forms of socialism. The version practiced in the US is the most deceitful one I know. An honest, courageous socialist government would say: this is a worthwhile social purpose (financing home ownership, helping my friends on Wall Street); therefore I am going to subsidize it; and here are the additional taxes (or cuts in other public spending) to finance it.
Instead the dishonest, spineless socialist policy makers in successive Democratic and Republican administrations have systematically tried to hide both the subsidies and size and distribution of the incremental fiscal burden associated with the provision of these subsidies, behind an endless array of opaque arrangements and institutions. Off-balance-sheet vehicles and off-budget financing were the bread and butter of the US federal government long before they became popular in Wall Street and the City of London.
[..]
So let’s call a spade a bloody shovel: nationalise Freddie Mac and Fannie May. They should never have been privatised in the first place. Cost the exercise. Increase taxes or cut other public spending to finance the exercise. But stop pretending. Stop lying about the financial viability of institutions designed to hand out subsidies to favoured constituencies. These GSEs were designed to make losses. They are expected to make losses. If they don’t make losses they are not serving their political purpose.
So I call on Secretary Paulson, Chairman Bernanke and Director Lockhart to drop the market-friendly fig-leaf. Be a socialist and proud of it. Come out of the red closet. The Soviet Union may have collapsed, but the cause of socialism is alive and well in the USA. Granted, the US version of socialism is imperfect thus far. The federal authorities have mainly intervened to socialise the losses in the financial sector while allowing the profits to continue to be drained off into selected private pockets. But that is bound to be an oversight. It surely cannot be the intention of such committed Marxists to target taxpayer-funded largesse solely at the very rich and at a few favoured, electorally sensitive constituencies. Fannie and Freddie are, or will be, safe in the hands of comrades Paulson, Bernanke and Lockhart.
Update, Sunday evening: A few hours after I posted this, CNN announced that the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve have a plan prop up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, undoubtedly hoping to head off more bloodletting when US markets open Monday morning.

29 May 2008

The last days of Bear Stearns

I’ve been a Wall Street Journal subscriber since college days, and was a charter subscriber at their web site, too.

With Rupert Murdoch’s ownership, I’m not sure WSJ is going in a direction that I want to follow. So I’ve recently subscribed (as an experiment) to the Financial Times, to assure myself of a steady stream of actionable news about business. Still too early to tell, but so far so good.

The links below are a reminder that the WSJ still does some things better than anybody else: it’s a three-part series, by Kate Kelly, that ran late this month on the final days of Bear Stearns as a business.
Excerpt from Day One:
Twelve hours after agreeing to sell Bear Stearns Cos. for $2 a share, Alan Schwartz wearily made his way to the company gym for a much-needed workout.

It was 6:45 a.m., March 17, and Bear Stearns's chief executive had slept little since hammering out the ugly details of his fire-sale deal with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

When Mr. Schwartz, already dressed in his business suit, trudged into the locker room, Alan Mintz, still in his sweaty gym clothes, made a beeline for the boss.

"How could this happen to 14,000 employees?" demanded the 46-year-old senior trader, thrusting his face uncomfortably close to Mr. Schwartz's. "Look in my eyes, and tell me how this happened!"

Two and a half months later, Mr. Schwartz still isn't quite sure. To Mr. Mintz and others, he has blamed a market tsunami he didn't see coming. He told a Senate committee last month: "I just simply have not been able to come up with anything, even with the benefit of hindsight, that would have made a difference."

21 April 2008

AngryRenter.com

All we hear these days is whining from reckless home borrowers and their banks.

But did you know that renters are 32 percent of American households? And that homes in foreclosure are less than 2 percent?

So why is Congress rushing to bailout high-flying borrowers and their lenders with our tax dollars?

Unfortunately, renters aren't as good at politics as the small minority of homeowners (and their bankers) who are in trouble. We don't have lobbyists in Washington, DC. We don't get a tax deduction for our rent and we don't get sweetheart government loans.

Quite simply, we are just Angry Renters. And now it is our time to be heard: no government bailouts!

The superficially-seeming grassroots AngryRenter.com is actually an Astroturfing project sponsored by FreedomWorks. (Of course, I'm fine with that, but we try to practice transparency here.)

29 January 2008

More on credit derivatives

Further to an earlier post:

28 January 2008

Derivatives, unintended consequences, and perverse incentives

A boom in the use of derivatives is giving creditors strong incentives to push troubled companies into bankruptcy rather than help rescue them, according to new research and industry experts.

A study by academics Henry Hu and Bernard Black concludes that, thanks to explosive growth in credit derivatives, debt-holders such as banks and hedge funds have often more to gain if companies fail than if they survive. The study suggests this development could endanger the stability of the financial system.

The findings highlight a crucial problem in corporate restructuring when more and more companies are facing financial difficulties. According to the research and industry practitioners, creditors have a strong interest in voting against a restructuring plan if they have bought credit or loan default swaps, which trigger payments when a company fails.

[...]

The problem is compounded by creditors not having to disclose derivatives positions, making it very difficult for companies and regulators to find out their real intentions.

Financial Times (ft.com): Derivatives boom raises risk of forced bankruptcy for companies (28 Jan 2008)

A "derivative financial transaction" is one that has no inherent value in and of itself; its value is derived from some aspect(s) of the underlying instruments or commodities.

The very first derivative transactions were options and futures in the agricultural commodities market: allowing a farmer to lock in a sale price for a crop that was still in the fields, for instance.

Derivatives transactions are, by their very nature, designed to transfer risk from one party to another at an appropriate price. Even as they have grown more exotic and incorporated vast amounts of leverage, it is arguable that their presence in the financial markets has been a net positive for the world.

But leverage is a tricky thing. The notional value of the world OTC derivatives market as of December 2007 was over $500 trillion (half a quadrillion) dollars, and the "gross market value" (the cost of replacing all open contracts at the prevailing market prices) was over $11 trillion; by way of reference, the annual GDP of the United States was "only" $13.3 trillion in 2006.

Even a small change in the underlying value that a derivatives contract is based on, under the right circumstances, can have massive repercussions.

And as derivatives become more and more abstracted from the instruments of underlying value, unintended consequences seem to be the sure result.

It's arguably good for the economy to allow counterparties to use credit default swaps to insure against payment-default risk.

But does anyone think it's good public policy that--as a net result of some of these complex transactions--we encourage creditors to force possibly-viable companies into bankruptcy because they (the creditors) are holding markers for a bet that will only pay off if that happens?

Wikipedia master article on derivatives

Articles on specific subtypes:
  • Futures/Forwards, which are contracts to buy or sell an asset at a specified future date.
  • Options, which are contracts that give a holder the right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell an asset at a specified future date.
  • Swaps, where the two parties agree to exchange cash flows.
"Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties record profits and losses -often huge in amount- in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands. The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man (or sometimes, so it seems, madmen)." -- Warren Buffett, Annual Report to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, 2002

24 January 2008

Making a living off the idiocy of big Wall Street firms

Michael Lewis explains how Goldman Sachs made a pile of money shorting the subprime mortgage market... even though its own traders were locked into very painful and costly long positions:
The only difference between Goldman and everyone else was that Goldman had, in effect, an entirely separate enterprise, sitting on top of the firm, with the power to reverse the judgment of its own supposed experts in various markets. They were able to do this, apparently, without ever saying a word about it to their own traders. Instead of telling the fools trading subprime mortgages that they are wrong, and that they should unwind their positions, they simply offset their trades.

Rolling Heads

All across Wall Street risk managers are being fired, reassigned or hovering under a cloud of contempt and suspicion. Heads must roll, and after the CEO, these guys are the most plausible to guillotine.

But at the same time it's pretty clear that a lot of these so-called risk managers never really had the power to manage risk. They had to consider the feelings, for example, of the guys who ran subprime mortgages. Morgan Stanley conceded as much when it said recently it was considering changing things around so that the risk manager reported to the CFO, rather than the heads of individual businesses.

But at Goldman there were two intelligences at work: one, the ordinary Wall Street intelligence, which was allowed to get itself in trouble, just as at every other Wall Street firm; the other, more like an extremely smart hedge fund that made its living off the idiocy of big Wall Street firms, including its own people.

Bloomberg.com: What Does Goldman Know That We Don't? (Michael Lewis)

via Kottke

18 December 2007

Stagflation on the way?

I've been one of those on the stagflation bandwagon, deeply concerned about the weakness of the dollar, the likelihood of the Fed continuing to reduce rates in the face of locked-up credit markets, rising food and energy prices and persistent and rising deficits. This is a toxic macroeconomic cocktail I've written about and which has been the source of much worry. And to add insult to injury, a rash of economic statistics were released last week that generated articles this weekend that only served to reinforce my Droopy Dog attitude towards the US economic landscape. So I'm here to share the pain.
Information Arbitrage: My Gloomy Thesis Is Playing Out (18 Dec 2007)

25 November 2007

This way to the recession

I wouldn't necessarily take advice from Lawrence Summers on matters of gender politics in academia, but the man's still one of the smartest economists on the planet.

And he thinks we're in a heap of trouble:
Three months ago it was reasonable to expect that the subprime credit crisis would be a financially significant event but not one that would threaten the overall pattern of economic growth. This is still a possible outcome but no longer the preponderant probability.

Even if necessary changes in policy are implemented, the odds now favour a US recession that slows growth significantly on a global basis. Without stronger policy responses than have been observed to date, moreover, there is the risk that the adverse impacts will be felt for the rest of this decade and beyond.
Wake up to the dangers of a deepening crisis (Lawrence Summers, Financial Times, 25 November 2007)

Read on for Dr. Summers' diagnosis and policy prescriptions.

26 October 2007

North Carolina's predatory-lending laws may travel

...[A]s Washington lawmakers hash out how to deal with millions of potential foreclosures, North Carolina's predatory-lending laws are shaping the debate.

...The North Carolina Home Loan Protection Act bans penalties for borrowers who pay off their mortgages early, mandates that lenders verify income, and is expected to limit the fees brokers collect for arranging certain high-rate mortgages...

... Critics of that 1999 law argued it would crimp North Carolina's housing market. But academic studies have found no such impact. In fact, the state thrived during the boom and has fared better than most during the downturn. Foreclosure filings rose 39% in this year's first half, far less than the 56% jump nationwide, according to research firm RealtyTrac. In the second quarter, median home prices were up 8% in Charlotte, the state's largest city, and Raleigh, the capital, vs. a 1.5% average drop for the U.S. "The bottom line is that [the regulations are] working," says North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper, who sponsored the 1999 law as a state senator. "North Carolina has strong banks that are tough but fair, and there's plenty of available credit."
These Tough Lending Laws Could Travel (BusinessWeek, November 5, 2007)

06 October 2007

Advice to foreigners: Sell your Treasury bonds

Andy Xie, writing in Caijing (a Chinese business publication that republishes some of its articles in English), states his case bluntly (you'll forgive, I hope, the mild awkwardness in translation):

In a closed economy, inflation is a zero-sum game in wealth redistribution. Investors in fixed income lose and borrowers win. As the US owes so much to foreigners, inflation, at least the unexpected part, adds value to the US economy. It does give the Fed incentives to tolerate more inflation. Why then it just lets it all out and inflates away all the foreign debts? The problem is that foreigners may see what’s coming and sell everything right away. It would trigger the US bond market to collapse, which would wreck havoc on the US economy. Hence, inflation benefits the US only if foreigners can be fooled before it happens. The Fed is still paying lip service to inflation for that purpose.

You probably know what I am getting at. If you hold US bonds, sell. The Fed wants to rob you to help the bankrupting US homeowners. My hunch is that the US inflation would rise to above 4% next year and higher afterwards. Foreigners own 40% of the US treasuries, mostly central banks. They should sell now to demonstrate they wouldn’t accept the broad daylight robbery by the Fed. The selling would cause the treasury yield to skyrocket, which would offset the stimulus from the rate cut by the Fed. The Fed may have to change policy to appease foreigners when it sees the rebellion.

If foreigners don’t act and lay there like lambs, they deserve to be slaughtered.

You Should Sell Treasuries (Andy Xie, Caijing Magazine, October 2, 2007)

18 September 2007

...so 2nite we're going to party like it's 1929

moral hazard: "A situation in which someone insured against risks will purposely engage in risky behavior, knowing that any costs incurred will be compensated by the insurer. A financial system which offers "rescue packages" may encourage borrowers and lenders to undertake low-quality or high-risk investments, thus increasing the likelihood of a crisis."

Related: Markets Soar After Fed Cuts Key Rate By Half A Point (New York Times, 18 September 2007)

14 September 2007

This has all happened before

Ganked directly from Marc Andreesen's blog:
He words it rather more politely than I would:

Advice to portfolio managers around the globe: please stop referring to "7-standard deviation events" when describing performance.

Whether it's the decline in home prices in real terms, a sudden widening of credit spreads, the impact of too much leverage on previously uncorrelated hedge fund strategies, a sudden shift in liquidity, a selloff in riskier emerging market stocks and bonds despite no change in fundamentals, unexpected outflows from fund investors, problems with credit derivatives or declines in bank credit lines, this has all happened before.

The smartest managers had prepared for volatility.

The good ones will learn from what's happened and make adjustments.

Those that spend too much time explaining why it wasn't likely in the first place fall into the bottom category.

From Michael Cembalest, Chief Investment Officer of JP Morgan Private Bank (not online).
blog.pmarca.com: Quote of the week: Michael Cembalest of JP Morgan

06 September 2007

Michael Lewis explains it all for you

The subprime mortgage / credit market mess, broken down for you by Michael Lewis at Bloomberg.com:

This is what happens when you lend money to poor people.

This is way too good to excerpt.  Go read the whole thing.

Oh, okay... *one* little excerpt:
Call me a romantic: I want everyone to have a shot at the American dream. Even people who haven't earned it. I did everything I could so that these schlubs could at least own their own place. The media is now making my generosity out to be some kind of scandal. Teaser rates weren't a scandal. Teaser rates were a sign of misplaced trust: I trusted these people to get their teams of lawyers to vet anything before they signed it. Turns out, if you're poor, you don't need to pay lawyers. You don't like the deal you just wave your hands in the air and moan about how poor you are. Then you default.
A Wall Street Trader Draws Some Subprime Lessons: Michael Lewis (Bloomberg.com)

18 August 2007

Neutron loans

“All of the old-timers knew that subprime mortgages were what we called neutron loans — they killed the people and left the houses,” said Louis S. Barnes, 58, a partner at Boulder West, a mortgage banking firm in Lafayette, Colo. “The deals made in 2005 and 2006 were going to run into trouble because the credit pendulum at the time was stuck at easy.”
Few Heard Ticking Credit Time Bomb - New York Times

10 August 2007

Understanding liquidity risk

A few generations ago, savers responded to financial panics with runs on banks, and even healthy institutions could fail if they could not raise enough cash quickly enough.

For a long time, that all seemed to be safely relegated to the past. But now the runs are back — and this time the targets are not banks but the securities that have replaced them as the prime generators of credit in the new financial system.

“Our current system of levered finance and its related structures may be critically flawed,” said William H. Gross, the chief investment officer of Pimco, a mutual fund company. “Nothing within it allows for the hedging of liquidity risk, and that is the problem at the moment.”

A New Kind Of Bank Run Tests Old Safeguards (New York Times, August 10, 2007)